volume	14,	no.	18 june	2014 Disagreement about Disagreement? What Disagreement about Disagreement? Alex Worsnip Yale University © 2014 Alex	Worsnip This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/014018/> D isagreement	is	a	hot	topic	in	epistemology.	A	fast-growing	literature centers around a dispute between the "steadfast"	view,	on	which	one	may	permissibly	maintain	one's	doxastic attitudes	even	in	the	light	of	disagreement	with	epistemic	peers	who have	all the	same	evidence,	and	the	"conciliationist"	view,	on	which such	disagreement	requires	a	revision	of these	attitudes.1	The	battle lines	here,	it	might	seem,	are	clear. On closer inspection, however, there is something odd about the disagreement debate. For pretty much all steadfasters and all conciliationists	agree	that	(i)	there	are	some	situations	in	which	you should	revise	your	doxastic	attitudes	in	the	face	of	disagreement	with a heretofore-thought epistemic peer; and (ii) there are some such situations in	which	you	should	not	revise	these	attitudes,	or	at least not	by	much.	In	terms	of	the	practical	advice	that	the	views	issue,	then, the	initial	clear	divide	between	the	"steadfast"	and	"conciliatory"	views is	not	so	clear	as	it	first	appears.	Moreover,	even	pinning	down	what separates	them	theoretically	can	be	a	tricky	matter. One possible response to this situation open to a theorist from either camp is to try to present the other side's central cases as exceptions to a broader pattern, and to explain what	makes them exceptional. That way, it might seem, the theoretical differences between the camps can be preserved	-	and	maybe they	will differ over	more	intermediate	cases. A different approach, and the one I	will pursue in this paper, is to	develop	a	view that is	moderate all the	way	down.	On this view, there is a	more comprehensive and gradual continuum of cases of disagreement, varying from those	which call for radical revision of doxastic	attitudes to those	which	call for	no	or	virtually	no	revision at all	-	with many gradations in between	-	differing primarily in degree,	not	in	kind.	Those	tempted	by	a	view	like	this	are	sometimes pessimistic	about	the	prospects	for	giving	a	unified	account	that	clearly 1. For	the	former	view,	see	Kelly	(2005,	2010),	Van	Inwagen	(2010),	and	Titelbaum (forthcoming), amongst others. For the latter view, see	Christensen (2007,	2011),	Elga	(2007),	and	Feldman	(2006),	amongst	others. ImprintPhilosophers' alex	worsnip What Disagreement about Disagreement? philosophers'	imprint – 2 – vol.	14,	no.	18	(june	2014) the convergence	of	moderate conciliationist and steadfast positions (respectively)	on	the	moderate	view	that	I	favor. 1. A framework for presenting the competing views One	might	naïvely	think	that	the	question	at	issue	in	the	disagreement debate	is	as	follows:	when	you	encounter	a	dispute	with	an	epistemic peer, should you maintain your belief or abandon it, suspending judgment?	However,	this	way	of	framing	things	is	oversimplified. First, one's options when one is confronted by a disagreement are	not	just	to	maintain	belief	or	suspend.	Rather,	one	can	alter	one's credence	in	the	proposition	at	issue	by	a	range	of	degrees,	as	is	wellappreciated	in	the	literature. Second,	a	similar	point	holds	about 'epistemic	peerhood,'	a term which	can	be	vague	or	differ	in	meaning	from	theorist	to	theorist,	and is	consequently	capable	of	being	misleading.	Discussion	of	epistemic peerhood	sometimes	proceeds	as	if	the	relevant	question	is	whether one's	interlocutor	is	intelligent	or	worthy	of	intellectual	respect.4	This is distorting.	What matters when it comes to disagreement is how likely	my	peer	is	to	be	right,	that	is,	how	reliable	she	is.	And	I	can	respect someone's	intellectual	powers	greatly	while	thinking	her	actual	views very	unreliable.	While	there	is	a	sense	in	which	I	should	think	of	such a	person	as	my	'epistemic	peer,'	it	is	not	the	relevant	sense	for	whether it	will	be	rational	to	conciliate	with	her.	Intelligence	is	not	the	same thing	as	reliability.5 4. Compare,	especially,	Van	Inwagen	(2010:	23–24). 5. It	might	be	objected	that,	in	appealing	to	the	claim	that	I	can	take	someone	to be	unreliable	whilst	respecting	them	as	having	equal	intellectual	powers	to mine,	I	beg	the	question	against	the	conciliationist	position.	According	to	the conciliationist,	this	objector	says,	there	is	no	reason	to	take	someone	to	be less	reliable	than	me	unless	I	can	chalk	it	up	to	some	difference	in	intelligence. But	this	misunderstands	the	conciliationist.	There	is	no	reason	why	a	conciliationist	should	commit	herself	to	the	claim	that	intelligence	is	all	I	can	legitimately	go	on	in	estimating	a	would-be	peer's	reliability.	Intelligent	people	can have	a	range	of	other	characteristics	that	make	them	bad	truth-trackers:	they can	be	under	the	sway	of	distorting	doctrines	and	ideologies;	they	can	have (perhaps	subconscious)	tendencies	to	believe	and	defend	extreme	or	radical positions	for	fun;	they	can	lack	common	sense;	they	can	be	psychologically predicts	when	more	or	less	extensive	revisions	will	be	called	for.2	By contrast,	in	this	paper	I	will	give	an	account	that	aspires	to	such	unity and	predictive	power.3	The	view	I	will	present	thus	amounts	to	a	new, moderate	theory	of	how	one	should	respond	to	disagreement. The	crucial	notion	for	the	view	I	will	defend	is	the	"net	resilience" of one's estimate of one's own reliability against one's estimate of one's	interlocutor's	reliability.	I	will	explain	what	this	means	and	why it	matters for how	we should respond to disagreement.	However, I will	also	argue	that	ultimately,	when	we	weaken	conciliationism	and the	steadfast	view	to	account	for	exception	cases,	and	to	make	them adequately	plausible,	they	end	up	converging	on	the	moderate	view	I present.	Much	of	the	seeming	disagreement	about	disagreement	is,	I will	argue,	illusory. I	proceed	as	follows:	section	1	addresses	the	setup	and	conceptual framework	required	to	present	competing	views	about	disagreement, building	up to introducing the key	notion	of net resilience. Section 2 begins the substantive argument by presenting extreme versions of conciliationism	and the steadfast	view in light	of this framework, and	giving some simple counterexamples to them.	These	views	are presented not because they are accepted by	many philosophers as they	stand,	but	simply	as	a	foil	to	establish	the	point	that	any	plausible view will have to concede that conciliation and steadfastness are each appropriate in at least some circumstances. Section 3 answers a	theoretical	challenge	posed	by	extreme	conciliationism	to	the	idea that	steadfastness	is	ever	called	for,	even	in	extreme	cases.	Section	4 presents	my	moderate	account	in	light	of	the	criticisms	of	the	extreme views,	and	explains	how	net	resilience	makes	the	difference	between cases	in	which	significant	conciliation	is	called	for	and	those	in	which	it is	not.	Section	5	deals	with	an	important	objection	to	my	view	inspired by some work by Roger	White. Finally, sections 6 and 7 argue for 2. See	esp.	Enoch	(2010). 3. Lackey	(2010a,	2010b)	also	presents	her	view	in	such	a	way.	See	section	4	for the	differences	between	our	accounts. alex	worsnip What Disagreement about Disagreement? philosophers'	imprint – 3 – vol.	14,	no.	18	(june	2014) her evidence. One	way to	measure this would be to	measure the probability	that	the	agent's	credence	is	closer	to	the	ideal	credence than	a	randomly	selected	credence	is	to	that	ideal	credence.	But	I	set these	details	aside	here. As	just	mentioned,	I	am	treating	reliability	and	evidential	position as	independent.	For	the	purposes	of	this	paper,	I	will	confine	myself to cases	where one takes oneself to share the same evidence	with one's interlocutor.8 A fully general model of how to respond to disagreement	would	relax	this	assumption,	and	allow	for	uncertainty about the relative evidential positions, either by treating this as a separate	variable	or	by	incorporating	it	into	the	measure	of	reliability. I	believe	that	this	can	be	done,	in	much	the	same	way	that	I	account for	uncertainty	about	one's	interlocutor's	reliability	in	this	paper.	But doing	so	is	not	crucial	to	my	project	of	showing	how	a	moderate	view on	disagreement	can	unify	the	different	existing	approaches,	and	nor does	this	complication	make	anything	I	have	to	say	here	inaccurate. So,	since I	do	not	wish	to	overcomplicate the	account, I	propose	to leave	this	extension	of	the	account	to	future	work. We	can	now	define	the	net reliability	in	a	disagreement	to	be	the difference	between	your	reliability	and	that	of	your	interlocutor.	So, to	map	this	onto	one	traditional	use	of 'epistemic	peer,'	you	would be	epistemic	peers	with	an	interlocutor	when	the	net	reliability	is	set at	zero. You	also	have	estimates	of	all	these	reliabilities.	I	take	it	that	it	can sometimes	be	very	non-transparent	to	you	what	your	credal	response to the evidence should	be; you can	also	be aware	of a track record that	indicates	that	you	do	not	always	get	close	to	the	ideal	credence. So,	I	assume	that	you	ought	not,	usually	at	least,	judge	yourself	to	be 8. Again,	one	might	think	that	we	rarely	share	the	same	evidence	for	a	proposition	in	the	way	that	the	disagreement	debate	standardly	assumes	we	can	(on this	point, see	esp.	King	2012:	253–258).	One	might think this	especially if one	follows	Williamson	(2000:	esp.	Chs.	8–10;	2007:	Ch.	7)	in	thinking	that evidence	consists	entirely	of	true	or	even	known	propositions. Given that it is reliability that is	at issue, it seems	clear that	one might	not	think	that	others	are	exactly	as	reliable	as	oneself	all that often.6	Perhaps	more	often,	one	thinks	that	one's	interlocutor	is	at	least somewhat	more	or	less	reliable	than	oneself;	again,	there	is	a	whole range	of	possible	estimated	levels	of	reliability. With	this	clarified,	let	us	operate	with	a	standard	range	of	possible credences	in	a	proposition	p	from	0	to	1,	where	1	marks	certainty	in	p, 0	marks	certainty	in	not-p,	and	0.5	marks	lending	equal	credence	to	p and	not-p. It's	more	obvious	how	to	operationalize	the	notion	of	reliability	in the	context	of	outright	belief than	in	the	context	of	credences.	With outright	belief,	we	can	just	talk	of	whether	someone's	beliefs	are	true or	false,	and	then	think	of	reliability	as	the	propensity	for	her	beliefs	to be	true.	But	not	so	with	credences.	And	in	my	view,	we	also	shouldn't measure	reliability	as	a	doxastic	agent's	propensity	to	have	a	credence close	to	1	when	a	proposition	is	true	and	close	to	0	when	it	is	false.	If we	did	this,	then	one	would	count	as	more	reliable	for	having	more conclusive	evidence	to	go	on:	two	agents	could	be	equally	ideal,	yet the one	with	more evidence	would count as	more reliable. But	we might	want	to	treat	evidential	position	and	reliability	as	independent rather	than	collapsing	them. There are, however, more sophisticated ways to understand reliability	in	the	context	of	credences.7	Here	is	one,	just	to	fix	ideas. Let	the	ideal credence	be	the	credence	which	the	agent's	evidence supports. Now we can define the relevant notion of reliability as the agent's propensity to get close to the ideal credence given invested	in	particular	views	for	arbitrary	historical	reasons.	Whilst	estimating these	things	can	be	hard,	and	it	can	be	hard	to	do	so	in	a	way	that	sets	aside the possibility that one's judgment is clouded	by one's own	possession	of these	characteristics,	the	same	is	true	of	assessing	(lack	of)	intelligence.	So,	I see	no	reason	why	the	conciliationist	should	limit	herself	to	the	latter	in	assigning	the	reliability	of	her	would-be	peers. 6. For	a	detailed	discussion	of	this	point,	see	King	(2012). 7. For	example,	in	terms	of	calibration;	see	Lam	(2013)	for	discussion	of	some possible	alternatives. alex	worsnip What Disagreement about Disagreement? philosophers'	imprint – 4 – vol.	14,	no.	18	(june	2014) with respect to your interlocutor's reliability, you	will be relatively unconfident in your estimate of your interlocutor's reliability. This level of confidence in the reliability estimate can be helpfully measured	by	the	resilience	of	the	reliability	estimate	in	response	to future	evidence.	The	more	confident	you	are	in	a	reliability	estimate, the	more resilient it is in response to future evidence of reliability, since	that	evidence	will	then	be	relatively	insignificant	compared	to what	you	already	have.11 Crucially,	having	an	unresilient	estimate	of	reliability	is	very	different from	having	a low	estimate	of reliability.	Your reliability	estimate is just	your	best	attempt	at	guessing	a	reliability.	But	this	could	be	based on	extensive track record information,	or	on	almost	nothing.	There could	easily	be	two	people	such	that	I	judge	both	to	be	equally	reliable when	forced	to	estimate	their	reliability,	but	whereby	I	am	much	more confident	in	my	judgment	with	respect	to	one	person	than	the	other. Accumulating	track-record	data	about	someone's	reliability	may	serve to	increase	my	estimate	of	her	reliability	in	some	cases,	but	in	others	it may	serve	to	raise	my	second-order	confidence	in	my	estimate	of	her reliability,	without	actually	increasing	that	estimate. In	the	same	way,	there	can	be	a	gap	between	the	resilience	of	my estimate	of	my	own	reliability	and	that	of	my	estimate	of	my	interlocutor. Call	this	the	net resilience,	where	a	positive	net	resilience	indicates	a higher	resilience	of	my	estimate	of	my	own	reliability	than	my	estimate of	my	interlocutor.	Since	the	resilience	of	a	reliability	estimate	is	not a	function	of	its	value,	net	resilience	is	likewise	not	a	function	of	your estimate	of	the	net	reliability.	I	can	estimate	our	reliability	at	the	same 11. For	general	discussions	of the importance	of resilience in	doxastic life, see Skyrms (1980) and Joyce (2005).	Note, however, that here it is not the resilience	of	your	credence	that	we	are	interested	in,	but	the	resilience	of	your estimate of your (and your interlocutor's) reliability.	Here	is	an	example	to	show how	the	two	can	come	apart:	you	tell	me	that	in	one	of	your	clenched	fists	is	a $100	note,	but	do	not	tell	me	which.	My	credence	that	the	$100	is	in	your	left hand	is	0.5.	The	resilience	of	my	credence	is	low:	a	small	amount	of	evidence could	easily	change	it.	But	I	take	myself	to	be	very	reliable	in	getting	close	to the	ideal	credence	(which	is	a	notion	sensitive	to	my	evidential	position)	in cases	like	this,	and	the	resilience	of	this	estimate	of	my	reliability	is	high. perfectly	reliable.	So,	you	have	a	reliability estimate both	for	yourself and	for	your	interlocutor.9 Now,	you	can	also	be	more	or	less	confident	that	each	reliability estimate	is	(roughly)	correct	-	that	is,	that	it	approximates	the	actual reliability of the agent.10 For example, if you have little to go on 9. In talking	of one's estimates	of reliability and their resilience, I	may cause the	reader	to	wonder	whether	I	really	intend	my	account	to	operate	in	terms of one's actual psychological estimate of reliability, or whether it should be	framed	in	terms	of	the	reliability	estimates	that	one's	evidence	supports. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this	point.) I	myself am sympathetic to the idea that the	requirements	governing	one's response to	disagreement	are	"wide	scope":	they	tell	you	that	it	is	required	of	you	that,	if	you begin	with	a	particular	set	of	credences,	reliability	estimates	and	resiliencies, and	you	encounter	a	disagreement,	then	you	revise	your	credences	in	some particular	way.	Here	the	credences	and	reliability	estimates	are	to	be	understood	as	the	ones	that	you	actually	have.	But	because	the	'requires'	operator takes	wide	scope	over	the	whole	conditional,	one	cannot	"detach"	a	requirement to fulfill the consequent of this conditional even	when the antecedent	is	satisfied.	So,	if	one	starts	with	all	the	wrong	credences	and	reliability estimates,	one	would	not	be	required	to	have	the	credence	that	would	result from	following the	disagreement	norm	beginning	with these	out-of-whack estimates.	And this is good,	because that credence	might	be	one that	one ought	not	to	have. In	such	conditions, following	the	disagreement	norm	is not	enough	to	guarantee	that	one	ends	up	with	the	credence	that	one	ought to	have.	Nevertheless,	the	fault	here	is	with	one's	original	estimates,	not	with one's	failure	to	observe	the	disagreement	requirement	correctly:	one	has	satisfied	that	requirement,	and	it	is	possible	to	satisfy	it	even	when	one's	original credences	and	estimates	are	incorrect.	So,	although	this	account	uses	one's actual	reliability	estimates,	it	does	not	amount	to	a	simple	"subjectivization" or	"psychologizing"	of	an	account	that	operates	in	terms	of	the	reliability	estimates	one	ought	to	have	given	the	evidence.	(For	more	on	wide-scope	requirements,	see	Broome	1999;	2013:	esp.	ch.	8;	Dancy	2000:	60–76.	I	develop the	view	with	respect	to	rational	belief	in	Worsnip	ms-b.) I	hope to	explore the idea	of reading	disagreement requirements	with wide	scope in future	work. In this	paper,	however, I	am	not relying	on it. The account here could easily be altered, for those	who reject the	widescope	account,	to	simply	utilize	the	estimates	that	one	ought	to	have	given the	evidence.	Any	such	readers	should	read	my	talk	of "estimates"	of reliability	accordingly. 10.	Note	that	such	a	lack	of	confidence	in	your	estimate	may	not	reflect	any	lack of	confidence	that	your	estimate	is	the	best	possible	estimate	given	the	evidence	you	have.	It	may	simply	reflect	limitations	in	how	much	evidence	you have,	which	make	it	unlikely	that	your	estimate	of	reliability	approximates the	actual	reliability. alex	worsnip What Disagreement about Disagreement? philosophers'	imprint – 5 – vol.	14,	no.	18	(june	2014) Nevertheless,	it	is	true	that	when	both	estimates	are	very	resilient (as opposed to	merely equally resilient), one	will be confident that one is about as reliable as one's peer. This highlights an ambiguity in	the	existing	disagreement	literature.	When	it	refers	to	interlocutors that	you	"(justifiably)	believe	to	be	your	epistemic	peer,"	or	similar,	it equivocates.14	This	could	mean	that,	when	forced	to	issue	an	estimate of their	reliability,	you	(justifiably)	estimate	that	reliability	at	a level very	close	to	your	own	estimate	of	your	own	reliability,	based	on	what you	have to	go	on.	Or it	could	demand	more: that the	estimates, in addition	to	being	equal,	both	be	(justifiably)	highly	resilient,	so	that you (justifiably) believe the proposition expressed by 'our actual reliabilities	are	approximately	equal.' This	second	possibility	makes	epistemic	peerhood	much	harder	to attain	than	the	first	does.	In	particular,	one	can	(justifiably)	estimate one's	own	reliability	at	precisely	the	same	level	as	one's	peer's,	but	not (justifiably)	believe	that	the	two	actual	reliabilities	are	approximately equal, if one	or	more	of the reliability estimates is unresilient.	This means that even though one estimates both reliabilities at the same level,	one is	not	at	all confident that this	estimate reflects the actual reliabilities. Indeed,	one	might (justifiably) think it	positively unlikely	that	the	reliabilities	are	actually	the	same,	whilst	(justifiably) estimating	them	at	the	same	level	based	on	what	one	has	to	go	on. 2. The extreme views Now	we're in	a	position	to	consider	some	possible	views.	Let's	start with	what	I'll	call	"extreme	conciliationism,"	which	is	a	development of	what	is	sometimes	called	the	"equal	weight"	view: are	"factorizable."	Likewise,	someone	with	a	high	confidence	that	she	and	her peer	are	equally	reliable	needs	to	be	justified	in	having	a	high	resilience	for both	parties	in	order	to	be	justified	in	having	this	high	confidence. 14. E. g.	Elga	(2007:	484),	Lackey	(2010a:	303–4),	and	Enoch	(2010:	971–2),	who misses this ambiguity in his otherwise comprehensive disambiguation of 'peer	disagreement'. level	but	have	a	much	higher	resilience	for	my	estimate	of	myself	than for	my	estimate	of	you. One	might	be	tempted	to	think	of	the	net	resilience	as	tracking	my level	of	confidence	that	I	am	just	as	reliable	as	my	peer.	But	this	is	not quite right.	Suppose that	my	estimate	of	my	own	reliability	and	my estimate	of	my	interlocutor's	reliability	are	equal	and,	moreover,	very resilient	to	an	equal	degree.	In	this	case	the	net	resilience	is	zero,	and I	am	confident	that	we	are	equally	reliable.	Now	compare	a	situation where	both	my	estimate	of	my	own	reliability	and	my	estimate	of	my interlocutor's	reliability	are,	though	still	equal,	very	unresilient	to	an equal	degree.	In	such	a	case,	my	net	resilience	is	still	zero,	but	I	am	not at	all	confident	that	I	am	as	reliable	as	my	peer.	So,	in	both	cases	the net	resilience	is	zero,	but	in	one	case	I	am	much	more	confident	that we	are	equally	reliable	than	in	the	other. What is	needed for the	net resilience to	be	high is that there	be a large	gap	between	the	resilience	of	my	estimate	of	myself	and	the resilience	of	my	estimate	of	my	peer.	According	to	the	account	I	will ultimately defend, it is the net resilience which matters	-	not my confidence	that	my	peer	and	I	are	equally	reliable.12	So,	to	know	how you	should	respond	to	disagreement,	we	need	to	know	your	individual reliability estimates and their resiliences	-	not just your level of confidence	in	the	claim	that	the	two	of	you	are	equally	reliable.13 12. Thanks	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	pushing	me	to	clarify	this	point. 13. An	anonymous	referee	worried	that	your	belief	in	peerhood	might	be	hard to	"factorize"	into	two	reliability	estimates	in	this	way.	But	although	it is	always	hard	to	attribute	very	precise	credences	to	agents,	I	do	not	think	it	is	implausible	that	rational	agents	have	factorized	judgments	about	reliability	in disagreement	cases.	Suppose	we	have	an	agent	who	is	very	uncertain	about whether	she	and	her	peer	are	equally	reliable.	It	seems	that,	if	she	is	responding	to	(what	she	takes	to	be)	evidence,	there	should	be	a	determinate	fact	of the	matter	as	to	whether	her	uncertainty	is	due	to	(i)	low	resilience	for	both reliability	estimates	or	(ii)	low	resilience	for	just	one	of	those	reliability	estimates.	Of	course,	she	probably	wouldn't	put	it	this	way	herself.	But	we	could imagine	asking	her	in	more	colloquial	terms:	"so,	you're	not	too	sure	that	you and	Mary	are	equally	reliable. Is that	because	you're	not	sure	how	reliable she	is,	or	because	you're	not	sure	how	reliable	either	of	you	are?"	If	she's	actually	basing	her	attitudes	on	the	relevant	evidence,	it	seems	that	there	should be	a	determinate	answer	to	that	question,	so	that	her	reliability	judgments alex	worsnip What Disagreement about Disagreement? philosophers'	imprint – 6 – vol.	14,	no.	18	(june	2014) myself.	Suppose	David	is	just	as	convinced	that	LIZARDS	is	true	as I	am	convinced that	LIZARDS is false,	and that there	are	no	major differences	in	the	evidence	available	to	myself	and	David.	Am	I	now required to increase	my confidence in LIZARDS to 0.5?	Of course not.	Rather,	what I	will	and	ought to	do is radically	downgrade	my estimation	of	David's	reliability,	at	least	with	regard	to	this	domain	of inquiry.	I	will	not	adjust	my	credence	in	LIZARDS	to	any	non-trivial degree. Consider	next	what	I	will	call	"extreme	steadfastness:" Extreme steadfastness. Encountering disagreement, at least	with anyone	who	you	do	not estimate as	more epistemically	reliable	than	you,	is	never	in	itself	a	reason to	adjust	your	credences.17 Extreme	steadfastness	is	also	not	even	slightly	plausible.	Consider	the following	kind	of	case,	familiar	from	the	literature:18 Dinner check.	I	go	out	for	dinner	with	seventeen	friends. At	the	end	of	the	meal,	my	friend	Cat	and	I	both	calculate what	our	third	friend,	Alfonso,	owes.	It	is	a	slightly	tricky calculation,	but	not	one	beyond	either	of	our	powers. I take	Cat	to	be	equally	reliable	as	me	at	mental	arithmetic, on	the	basis	of	numerous	similar	past	occasions.	I	come up	with	$21.74,	and	form	credence	0.9	in	the	proposition that Alfonso owes $21.74.	Next I discover that Cat has credence	0.9	that	the	amount	Alfonso	owes	is	$22.74. Quite	obviously,	I	should	revise	down	my	credence	in	the	proposition that Alfonso owes $21.74. More generally, the idea that I could justifiably maintain the same credences about some proposition p regardless of	whether every person I know that I do not judge to be my 17. The	closest	to	an	advocate	of	this	extreme	view	in	the	literature	is	the	early Kelly	(2005:	see	esp.	his	formulation	of	his	view	on	p.	170). 18. See,	e. g.,	Christensen	(2007:	193). Extreme conciliationism. Whenever you encounter a disagreement with someone who possesses the same evidence	as	you,	you	are	required	to	adjust	your	credence in	the	proposition	at	issue	in	proportion	with	your	prior net reliability estimate and your relative credences. In particular, if your	net reliability estimate is	0, and	your credence	in	p	is	equal	to	your	interlocutor's	credence	in not-p, then	you	are required to	adjust	your	credence to 0.5.15 Extreme	conciliationism is	not	even	slightly	plausible.	Consider the following	case: The lizards.	At	a	philosophy	conference in	Washington DC,	I	meet	David.16	Considering	myself to	be	a	roughly average epistemic agent amongst philosophers, and David to be a randomly sampled philosopher, I am initially inclined to	make a net reliability estimate of 0, though	of	course	my	net	resilience is	high,	since	I	have very	little	to	go	on	about	David	so	far.	After	a	bit	of	idle chatter about the	weather and the conference program, I	mention that on	my off-day I am planning to go and see the	White	House. "Don't go there!" exclaims	David. "The	US	government	is	run	by	a	sinister	race	of	disguised lizards.	All	the	major	governments	of	the	world	are." David	and I	disagree	about	whether the	major	governments	of the world are run by a sinister race of disguised lizards (henceforth, LIZARDS).	And,	prior	to	our	conversation	about	lizards,	I	assigned David approximately the same level of reliability that I assigned 15. The	closest	to	an	advocate	of	this	extreme	view	in	the	literature	is	Elga	(2007). 16. So	named	for	David	Icke,	a	former	football	player	and	sports	journalist	from England	who	espouses	roughly	the	same	theory	as	my	imagined	interlocutor. See	http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Icke alex	worsnip What Disagreement about Disagreement? philosophers'	imprint – 7 – vol.	14,	no.	18	(june	2014) David's	reliability.20	This	takes	place	in	response	to	a	kind	of	mismatch: given our disagreement, it seems that I ought not both have a low credence	in	LIZARDS	and	attribute	high	reliability	to	David.	Holding either	my	credence	or	my	reliability-attribution	constant,	it	will	seem that the disagreement provides evidential grounds for revising the other. It's seriously	misleading to say that, in resisting revising	my credence,	I	am	doing	so	"on	the	grounds"	that	David	is	unreliable. If	I	were	doing	something	problematically	circular	here,	it's	hard	to see	why	the	alternative	response	to	the	situation	-	revising	my	credence rather	than	my	reliability-estimate	-	would	not	also	be	circular.	After all,	it	is	just	the	other	choice	that's	available	to	get	rid	of	the	mismatch. Just as the extreme conciliationist tries to demand that I hold my antecedent	reliability	estimate	constant	in	the	face	of	disagreement,	we could	demand	that	I	hold	my	antecedent	credence	constant	in	the	face of	disagreement.	Then	we	could	put	the	following	parallel	circularity objection	to	me	if	I	conciliate:	"you	are	resisting	revising	your	reliability estimate	on	the	grounds	of	your	(now)	higher	credence	in	LIZARDS. But	your	higher	credence	in	LIZARDS	in	turn	depends	upon	thinking that	David	is	reliable.	So,	your	reasoning	is	circular!" If this circularity objection is a bad objection to extreme conciliationism, the extreme conciliationist's circularity objection to	alternative	views is likewise	bad.	Thus, I see	no	reason to	accept the extreme conciliationist's view that I must hold	my credence in my interlocutor's reliability fixed, and revise my credences in the proposition	at	issue	in	light	of	the	former.	I	can	be	just	as	free	to	revise the	latter. Now,	actual	conciliationists,	unlike	extreme	conciliationists,	usually admit	that	in	cases	like	the lizards,	I	may	permissibly	downgrade	my 20.	One	might	wonder	whether	there	is	a	third	option:	maintaining	my	current credence	without	downgrading	my	estimate	of	David's	reliability,	chalking	it up	to	an	uncharacteristic	error	on	his	part.	(Thanks	to	an	anonymous	referee for	raising	this	point.)	In	section	4,	I	will	argue	that	in	cases	like	that	of	David, one	is	positively	warranted	in	downgrading	one's	estimate	of	one's	interlocutor's	reliability.	In	section	7,	I	will	take	on	the	proposal	that	there	are	other cases	where	one	is	justified	in	remaining	steadfast	without	being	warranted in	downgrading	one's	interlocutor,	and	argue	against	it. epistemic superior	agrees,	orwhether	no people I know that I do not judge to be my epistemic superior agree,	is	incredible.	Clearly,	such	variation	can serve	as	relevant	evidence	in	determining	whether	p	is	true.19 3. The circularity charge Well, those are the intuitions. But extreme conciliationism does at least	pose	us	a	challenge.	It	goes	like	this:	revising	my	evaluation	of David's reliability in the lizards seems in	some	way	problematically circular. David and I are disagreeing about LIZARDS, and I am resisting	revising	my	credence	on	the	grounds	that	David	is	unreliable. But	my	assessment	of	his	reliability	in	turn	depends	on	me	assuming that	he	is	wrong	to	believe	LIZARDS.	So,	how	could	this	be	grounds for	remaining	steadfast	in	my	very	low	credence	for	LIZARDS? I	think	this	is	the	wrong	way	to	think	about	things.	I	am	not	resisting revising	my credence "on the grounds" that David is unreliable, in some	way	that	rests	upon	the	assumption	that	my	credence	is	correct. Rather,	I	am	considering	two	possible	courses	of	action	in	response	to our	disagreement:	revising	my	credence,	and	revising	my	estimate	of 19. In	his	early (but	not	his later)	work,	Kelly (2005: 182–3)	appeared to	deny this,	affirming	that	only	the	arguments	bearing	directly	on	the	truth	of	some proposition p count as relevant evidence, and that	what others think	-	as an "empirical and contingent fact"	-	does	not. (Oddly,	Kelly allows in this same	article	[2005:	173–74]	that	a	disagreement	with	someone	who	is	your epistemic superior can give you evidence that calls for a revision in your credence,	even though	his	argument	could	easily	be	adapted to	cover	disagreement	with	epistemic	superiors.)	Kelly	makes	this	seem	more	plausible by	getting	us to imagine two	worlds such that the	arguments that	we	are aware	of	with	respect	to	p's	truth	are	identical	across	the	two	worlds,	but	one world	exhibits	great	consensus	about	p	and	the	great	disagreement.	In	doing so,	however,	Kelly	effectively	stipulates	that, in	the	comparison	of	the	two cases, the	difference	between	consensus	and	disagreement is	mere	noise: it	doesn't	track	any	difference	in	the	facts.	The	problem	is	that	a)	on	the	assumption	that	one's	peers	tend	to	be	reliable	to	some	extent,	their	verdicts are	not	usually	mere	noise	in	the	way	Kelly	effectively	stipulates;	and	b)	even if	this	were	the	case,	and	the	disagreement	of	one's	peers	were	simply	misleading	evidence,	one	would	not,	as	an	actual	party	to	the	disagreement,	be in	a	position	to	know	this.	Indeed,	something	is	misleading	only	if	you	don't know	that	it's	misleading.	That's	why	even	misleading	evidence	can	call	for revision	of	doxastic	attitudes. alex	worsnip What Disagreement about Disagreement? philosophers'	imprint – 8 – vol.	14,	no.	18	(june	2014) First,	an	existing	proposal	from	Jennifer	Lackey:	the	difference	is that,	whereas	in	dinner check,	you	give	some	antecedent	credence to the	chance	you	might	be	wrong, in	the lizards,	you	(justifiably) give	very	little	antecedent	credence	to	this.23	There	are	some	things that	are	beyond	the	pale,	and	LIZARDS	is	one	of	them;	that's	what makes	the	difference. This	cannot,	I	think,	be	right.	My	high	confidence	that	LIZARDS	is false	serves	as	a	high	baseline	from	which	to	start	my	revisions,	but	it does	not	on	its	own	explain	why	there	is	little	to	no	pressure	to	move away	from	this	baseline	to	at	least	some	degree.	Perhaps,	if	I	am	very confident	to	start	with,	my	final	credence	will	be	higher	than	it	would have	been	otherwise;	but the amount I reduce my credence by	may	not be.	It's	telling	here	that	Lackey's	view	finds	more	natural	expression	in terms	of	binary	belief	than	in	terms	of	credence.24	For	when	it's	binary belief that's at issue, a higher starting baseline of confidence could explain	why	disagreement	does	not	call	for	the	all-out	abandonment of	the	belief,	even	if	that	confidence	should	be	reduced	substantially. Nevertheless,	this	does	not	mean	that	the	high	baseline	is	reducing	the amount	of	pressure	to	revise	the	confidence	down	from	that	baseline. Indeed,	there	can	be	situations	in	which	I	am	very	confident	about something, and	even justifiably so,	but encountering	disagreement warrants	reducing	this	confidence	(after	all,	the	disagreement	is	itself anything	general	can	be	said	about	what	determines	the	balance	between revising one's credence and revising one's reliability estimate. Here, I attempt	to	be	more	ambitious,	and	thereby	show	that	something	general	can be	said	about	this. 23. Lackey	(2010a:	306–8,	and	esp.	316–9).	See	also	Elga's	(2007:	483)	claim	that his conciliatory	view	doesn't apply "outside	an	appropriate range,"	namely when	you	find	your	disputant's	contentions	"insane"	(ibid.:	491).	It's	unclear why,	if	this	can	prevent	one	entirely	from	having	to	conciliate	for	Elga,	finding one's disputant's contentions, say, somewhat-less-than-insane-but-still-surprising-and-odd	doesn't	even	temper	the	need	to	give	her	view	equal	weight. 24. See	Lackey	(2010a:	310).	Lackey	considers	an	objection	to	her	account	based on	its	use	of	binary	belief	at	(2010b:	282–3),	but	this	objection	is	not	the	same as	mine	and	so	her	response	does	not	address	my	worry. estimate	of	David's	reliability.	Such	actual	conciliationists	nevertheless sometimes	want	to	appeal	the	circularity	objection,	often	putting	the point	in	terms	of	a	need	for	my	reasons	for	dismissing	my	interlocutor to	be	"independent"	of	the	dispute	at	hand.21 Prima facie,	however, it seems	that	my	decision	to	downgrade	my	estimate	of	David's	reliability is	not	independent	of	the	dispute	at	hand:	I	have	downgraded	David in response to the craziness of his claim that LIZARDS is true. But there	may	be	a	more	subtle	notion	of independence	at	work,	which counts	my reasons for downgrading	David as suitably independent, while	still	counting	other	cases	of	downgrading	as	objectionably	nonindependent.	In	section	6,	I'll	return	to	this	question	in	much	greater detail,	in	the	course	of	arguing	that	the	more	moderate	conciliationist view	converges	with	my	own. 4. Explaining what makes the difference I've just argued that, from the point of view of circularity, there is nothing necessarily more objectionable about revising one's reliability-estimate	than	there	is	about	revising	one's	credence.	But	this leaves	open	which	of	these	options	I	should	in	fact	take	in	particular cases. Intuitively, I find it clear that in the case of the lizards, it is more	reasonable	to	choose	to	revise	my	reliability-attribution	than	to revise	my	credence.	Conversely, in	dinner check, the right reaction is to revise	down	my	credence	and	maintain	my	reliability	estimate. So,	whether I should revise	my credence or	my reliability estimate depends	on	the	particular	case.	Call	this	view	the	boringly moderate account.	I	think	that	the	boringly	moderate	account	is	true.	But	it	also seems to	me that	we should be unsatisfied	with simply stating the boringly	moderate account as it stands.	We	want an explanation	of what	makes the	difference	between the	cases, and	we	want	a	more generalized	account	of	when I should revise	my reliability estimate, and	when	my	credence.22	This	is	what	I'll	give	shortly. 21. See	esp.	Christensen	(2011). 22. Enoch (2010: 992–95) endorses something similar to the boringly	moderate	account	-	calling	it	the	"common-sense	view"	-	but	rejects	the	idea	that alex	worsnip What Disagreement about Disagreement? philosophers'	imprint – 9 – vol.	14,	no.	18	(june	2014) seemingly	reliable	source,	and	that	is	at	least	some	evidence	against both of your reliabilities. This point is recognized on all sides. But conciliationists have argued that, since your estimates of your own reliability and that of your interlocutor are equal, the	disagreement cannot be evidence against either disputant's reliability more than the	other.26	So,	even	if	you	should	downgrade	your	estimate	of	your disputant's	reliability,	you	should	do	the	same	for	yourself;	so,	you	are not	licensed	in	resisting	revising	your	credence	concerning	the	matter under	dispute. This	has	some	initial	plausibility.	And	this	reasoning	does	indeed hold	as long	as	the	net	resilience is	zero	(regardless	of the	absolute level	of the resiliences	–	as long	as they	are the same).	But it is an overgeneralization	to think	that it	applies to	any	case	where	merely the	estimated	reliabilities	are	the	same.	This	overlooks	the	importance of	resilience. Let me explain. First, note that if your estimate of your own reliability	is	highly	resilient,	then	quite	a	lot	of	evidence	is	required to shake it. Conversely, less evidence is required to shake a less resilient	estimate	of	your interlocutor's	reliability.	Second,	note	also that the existence of the disagreement provides different evidence relative to	which	estimate	we	are considering it in relation to.	The evidence	against	the	accuracy	of	your	estimate	of	your	own	reliability is	that	you	have	disagreed	with	someone	whom	you	estimate	to	be highly	reliable	based	on	what	little	you	have	to	go	on.	Conversely,	the evidence	against	the	estimate	of	your	interlocutor's	reliability	is	that he	or	she	has	disagreed	with	someone	whom	you	estimate	to	be	highly reliable	based	on	extensive	evidence	and	track-record	data	(namely, you!).	The	result	of	all	of	this	is	that,	when	the	net	resilience	is	high,	so that	your	estimate	of	your	own	reliability	is	much	more	resilient	than that	of your interlocutor, the	disagreement can	provide	on-balance 26.	See, e. g.,	Christensen (2007: 196–98), and	Elga (2007: 487),	who calls the idea	that	a	disagreement	can	provide	evidence	that	you	are	a	better	evaluator than	your	interlocutor	"absurd."	Though,	compare	Elga	(2007:	491). new evidence).25 Roughly speaking, these	will be situations	where I	expect	not	to	encounter	disagreement	about	some	matter	because I take it to be uncontroversial, yet my being so confident is itself conditional on not encountering such disagreement. It is perfectly coherent	to	simultaneously	have	a	very	high	credence	in	a	proposition, yet to have a significantly lower credence in it conditional on encountering	a	disagreement,	provided that	one thinks it relatively unlikely that one will encounter disagreement. And there seems no in-principle bar to all of these attitudes being strongly justified, even if the claim that one will not encounter disagreement turns out	ultimately to	be false. So, the level of one's	first-order justified credence	cannot	directly	predict	the	amount	of	revision	of it that is called	for	by	encountering	disagreement. What	really	explains	the	amount	of	revision	called	for,	I	suggest,	is my	net	resilience.	In	dinner check,	I	have	a	low	net	resilience,	because I have a lot to go on in estimating Cat's reliability. In the lizards, conversely, I have a high net resilience. I attribute a high level of reliability	to	myself	in	the	circumstances	-	this	is	not	the	kind	of	case where	it	seems	difficult	to	work	out	what	the	evidence	supports	-	and I	am	very	confident in	this	high	attribution	of	reliability.	Conversely, while	I	attribute	to	my	interlocutor	high	reliability	-	there's	no	reason to	think	that	he's	a	lunatic	antecedent	to	the	dispute	-	I	am	not	very confident	in	this	high	attribution	of	reliability,	since	I	have	very	little	to go	on	in	arriving	at	it.	Given	that	my	estimate	of	my	own	reliability	is fairly	resiliently	set	at	a	high	point,	but	my	estimate	of	my	interlocutor's reliability is	much	more	sensitive	to	possible	evidential	updates,	my net	resilience	will	be	high. Why does the net resilience make the difference that it does? Suppose	that	you	estimate	your	interlocutor's	reliability	and	your	own roughly equally at some level above	0.5. Then, a disagreement can be	evidence	that	you	estimated	at least	one	of these	reliabilities too high.	After	all,	both	you	and	your	interlocutor	have	disagreed	with	a 25. For	a	compelling	example,	see	Christensen	(2007:	200). alex	worsnip What Disagreement about Disagreement? philosophers'	imprint – 10 – vol.	14,	no.	18	(june	2014) own	track	record	than	one	does	regarding	one's	interlocutor.28	But	the net	resilience	will	not	usually	be	as	high	as	it	is	in	the lizards. I	suggest	that	in	such	intermediate	cases,	the	thing	to	do	is	to	revise both	my	credence	in	the	proposition	at	hand,	and	my	estimate	of	my interlocutor's	reliability.	In	this	way,	I	can	find	a	sort	of	equilibrium.29	A reduction	of	either	my	credence	or	my	reliability	estimate	tempers	the need	to	reduce	the	other.	If	my	credences	are	extremely	fine-grained, I	may	even	do	some	tiny	revising	of	my	credence	in	LIZARDS	in	the lizards, and alter my estimation of Cat's reliability ever-so-slightly in	dinner check (though	clearly, I	should	reverse	this	change	in	the latter	case	if	she	subsequently	turns	out	to	be	right).	But	not	much.	The balance	of	whether	I	should	make	more	of	a	revision	in	my	credence in	the	proposition,	or	in	my	estimation	of	my	interlocutor's	reliability, depends	on	my	net	resilience. 5. White's challenge Of	the	existing	work	on	disagreement,	the	paper	which	comes	closest to	discussing	the	view	I	have	suggested	here	is	White	(2009:	247–249). There,	White	makes	some	remarks	that	may	provide	some	resources for	an	extreme	conciliationist	to	push	back	against	the	view.	So,	it	is worth	considering	the	challenge	that	White	issues. White	agrees	that	what	I	have	called	net	resilience	is	of	significance in	situations	of	disagreement.	However,	he	thinks	that	its	significance is limited to its effect on your judgment of your peer's reliability. 28.	Of	course,	there	are	unusual	cases	where	the	net	resilience	is	actually	negative,	such	that	your	estimate	of	your	interlocutor's	reliability	is	more	resilient than	that	of	your	own.	In	such	unusual	cases,	the	disagreement	would	actually	provide	reason	to	downgrade	your	estimate	of	your	own	reliability,	and give	your	interlocutor's	judgment	more	weight	than	your	own. 29.	Note	that	this	view	does	not	require	any	kind	of	problematic	attempt	to	get outside	one's	own	internal	perspective	or	belief	system,	a	worry	that	Enoch (2010:	961–65)	has	about	conciliationist	views.	The	incoherence	in	maintaining a high estimate of	my interlocutor's reliability and	maintaining a high credence	in	the	proposition	under	dispute	is	an	entirely	internal	one	that	can be	felt	acutely	from	a	first-person	perspective.	(I	think	a	similar	defense	may work	for	more	extreme	conciliationist	views,	though	as	I	have	made	clear,	I reject	these	views	for	other	reasons.) evidence that your estimate of your interlocutor's reliability is too high.	Indeed,	this	can	be	shown	mathematically.27 Since the net resilience makes a difference to when I can downgrade	my	estimate	of	an	interlocutor's	reliability,	it	also	makes a	difference	to	when	I	can	be	steadfast	in	my	credence.	When	the	net resilience	is	high,	and	I	am	permitted	to	downgrade	my	estimate	of my	interlocutor's	reliability	to	a	great	extent	-	as	in	the lizards -	this eliminates the need to downgrade my credence to any significant extent. However, when my net resilience is low, and I am not permitted	to	downgrade	my	estimate	of	my	interlocutor's	reliability	to any	great	extent	-	as	in	dinner check -	I	will	have	to	downgrade	my credence	significantly. These	are	extreme	cases,	however. In the	bulk	of	actual cases	of disagreement, the	net resilience	will	be	more intermediate.	The	net resilience	is	almost	always	going	to	be	some	positive	non-zero	value, just	because	one	typically	has	much	better	evidence	regarding	one's 27. Here is an illustration, adapted from	White (2009: 247–48). (Despite the helpfulness	of	White's	example	for	my	purposes	here,	White	himself	denies a	crucial	part	of	my	account	of	the	significance	of	resilience,	as	I	will	explain in	section	5.)	Suppose	that	you	know	for	certain	that	you	are	0.9	reliable	on some	matter.	As for	your interlocutor,	you	know	she is	either .85, .9	or .95 reliable, but	have	no idea	which. So, you	estimate	both reliabilities as	0.9, but	your	resilience in	your	estimate	of	your	own	reliability is	much	higher than	that	of	your	estimate	of	your	interlocutor.	Suppose	a	disagreement	now occurs.	Since	you	know	that	you	are	0.9	reliable,	you	can	reason	as	follows: "Conditional	on	her	being	95%	reliable, the	antecedent	probability	that	she would	disagree	with	me	(where	I	am	.9	reliable)	was	.14.	Conditional	on	her being	90%	reliable,	the	antecedent	probability	that	she	would	disagree	with me	(still	90%	reliable)	was	.18.	Conditional	on	her	being	85%	reliable,	the	antecedent	probability	that	she	would	disagree	with	me	(still	90%	reliable)	was .22.	So,	the	fact	that	we	disagreed	alters	the	balance	of	evidence	between	the possible	reliabilities	for	my	interlocutor,	lending	most	weight	to	the	85%	possibility,	then	the	90%	possibility,	then	the	95%	possibility.	So,	I	have	gained some	evidence	that	should	shift	my	estimate	of	her	reliability	down	from	its original	level	of	0.9."	The	argument	generalizes	for	any	case	where	there	is a	difference	in	resilience	between	the	estimates	of	the	two	reliabilities	and where	those	reliability	estimates	exceed	0.5.	When	there	is	a	disagreement	in such	a	case,	one	gains	evidence	that	should	shift	the	less	resilient	reliability estimate	downwards.	The	evidence	provided	by	the	disagreement	is	not	neutral	between	that	reliability	estimate	being	too	low	and	its	being	too	high. alex	worsnip What Disagreement about Disagreement? philosophers'	imprint – 11 – vol.	14,	no.	18	(june	2014) great	degree.	Suppose	that	I	follow	White's	advice	and	downgrade	my estimate	of	David's	reliability,	but	nevertheless	increase	my	credence in	LIZARDS	to	0.5.	I'm	now	left	with	the	following	set	of	judgments	at this	point	in	time: • My	initial	verdict	on	this	matter	was	that	the	world	is	not run	by	disguised	lizards. • David's	initial	verdict	was	that	the	world	is	run	by	disguised lizards. • I estimate	my initial verdicts on	matters like these to be much	more	reliable	than	David's. • Nevertheless, I'm	no	more	confident	that	the	world	is	not run	by	disguised	lizards	than	that	it	is. This set of beliefs seems	bizarre at best and incoherent at	worst. If your	verdicts	on	matters	like	these	are	more	reliable	than	David'	-	and your	best	estimate,	based	on	your	latest	assessment	of	the	evidence,	is that	they	are	-	surely	by	your	own	lights	you	have	evidence	favoring the	hypothesis	that	the	world	is	not	run	by	disguised	lizards.	And	it	is evidence	which, it seems,	has	not	been factored into	your	credence. It's not like there is some other strong reason to prefer the lizards hypothesis which is counteracting it. This suggests that intuitively, White	is	wrong	to	say	that	the	downgrade	in	the	estimate	of	David's reliability should not temper the downgrade in credence for the proposition	that	the	world	is	not	run	by	disguised	lizards. Does this intuitive objection require the rejection of Bayesian conditionalization?	No.	Note	that	there	are	two	basic	steps	in	White's derivation	of	his result. First, there is the claim that given	an	equal estimate	of	my	own	reliability	and	that	of	my interlocutor,	my	prior credence	in	p	conditional	on	the	disagreement	should	be	0.5.	Second, there is the simple move of Bayesian conditionalization, namely that	given that	prior credence,	upon learning	of	a	disagreement	my credence	in	p	should	move	to	0.5.	Now,	if	we	try	to	block	the	second Specifically, he thinks that if you encounter disagreement with someone	who	you	judge	to	be	equally	reliable	as	yourself,	but	your estimate of your own reliability is	more resilient than that of your interlocutor, then you are	warranted in downgrading your estimate of your interlocutor's reliability. Here we agree. But White denies that	this	warrants	you	in	tempering	your	reduction	of	credence	in	the matter	under	dispute.30	This	reduction	of	credence,	he	thinks,	depends on	your	prior	estimates	of	reliability,	but	not	on	their	resilience.	White takes	this	to	be	a	straightforward	result	of	Bayesian	conditionalization: given	your	equal	estimate	of the	two	reliabilities,	you	should	take	it that either is equally likely to err. So, if, for example, you	and	your interlocutor	have	pre-disagreement	credences	for	some	proposition	p that	are	equally	distant	from	the	midpoint	of	0.5,31	your	prior	credence for	p	conditional	on	a	disagreement	should	be	0.5.	So,	upon	learning of	a	disagreement,	you	should	revise	your	credence	in	p	to	0.5.	The resilience	of	the	reliability	estimates	has	no	effect	here. Let's begin by noting the intuitive costs of this view. First,	most simply,	it	entails	that	in	the lizards -	if	I	really	have	estimated	David	to be	as	reliable	as	me	(just	with	lower	resilience	in	this	estimate)	-	the right response to the disagreement with David is to increase my credence	in	LIZARDS	to	0.5.	That	is,	on	its	own,	still	an	incredible	view. But	moreover,	White's	concession	that	I	should	downgrade	my	estimate of	my	interlocutor's	reliability	in	such	a	case	yields	a	further	very	odd result.	Since	the	resilience	of	my	own	reliability	is	high,	my	estimate of	my	own	reliability	is	largely	unaffected.	Nevertheless,	my	estimate of	David's	reliability	is	brought	down	by	White's	lights,	potentially	to	a 30.	By	contrast,	in	his	original	presentation	of	the	equal	weight	view,	Elga	(2007: 486–8)	thought that it	was	precisely	because	you're	not	permitted	to	downgrade your estimate of your interlocutor's reliability that you have to give her	opinion	equal	weight:	indeed,	that	is	his	central	argument	for	the	equal weight	view.	So,	Elga	seems	to	implicitly	agree	with	me,	against	White,	that were this downgrade	permissible, the	need to conciliate on your credence would	be	tempered.	See	also	Weatherson	(ms.:	9). 31. I'll	continue	to	work	with	this	simplifying	assumption	throughout	this	section. All	the	arguments	generalize	easily	once	the	assumption	is	relaxed. alex	worsnip What Disagreement about Disagreement? philosophers'	imprint – 12 – vol.	14,	no.	18	(june	2014) first thought	-	and	consequently I should	not form	credence	0.9 in your	answer.34	This,	obviously, is	no	violation	of	conditionalization: while	my	conditional	credence for	p	given	your	answering	p is	0.9, my conditional credence for	p	given	your answering	p	and singing and	throwing	anchovies	is	somewhat	lower. In	the	case	of	disagreement,	given	a	resilient	estimate	of	my	own reliability	and	an	equal,	but	less	resilient,	estimate	of	your	reliability, the	very	occurrence	of	a	disagreement is	evidence that	you	are less reliable	than	first	thought	(to	reiterate,	White	concedes	this).	And	so, just	as	we	should	not	say	that	I	am	required	to	calculate	my	credence for	p	based	on	my	old	reliability	estimate	in	the	Requiem-and-anchovies case,	we	should	not	say	that	I	am	required	to	calculate	my	credence for	p	based	on	my	old reliability	estimate	here.	Again, this requires no	violation	of	conditionalization.	My	credence	for	p	conditional	on	a disagreement	between	us	should	not	be	0.5,	even	though	I	currently estimate	our	reliability	as	equal,	because	I	know	in	advance	that	were that	disagreement	to	occur,	that	would	be	evidence	that	we	are	not	in fact	equally reliable.	This	allows	us to	save the	view	advanced	here from	White's	objection. The	point	here	mirrors	a	now	well-established	point	in	the	literature on	conditionals.	Adams'	Thesis,	roughly	stated,	is	that	the	probability of	a	conditional	is	equal	to	the	probability	of	its	consequent	conditional on	its	antecedent.35	This	thesis	initially	seems	plausible,	but	there	are counterexamples	to	it	that	take	a	specific	form.36	Here	is	one	example.37 34. Indeed,	White	thinks	(2009:	241)	that	when	one	gains	evidence	that	a	source is inaccurate	on	a	given	occasion, this	can	be reason	not to line	one's	credence	up	with	one's	estimate	of	its	general	reliability.	Rightly,	he	doesn't	take this	to	be	a	violation	of	conditionalization!	So,	it's	unclear	why	this	wouldn't also	apply	when	one	gains	an	even	stronger	kind	of	evidence:	that	it	is	in	fact unreliable	more	generally,	and	that	one's	original	estimate	of its	reliability was	mistaken. 35. See	Adams	(1965). 36.	See	McGee	(2000) for the	original	counterexample,	and	Kaufmann	(2004) for	a	systematic	account	of	what	generates	such	counterexamples. 37. I	learned	of	this	example	from	Steve	Yablo.	I	have	adapted	it	somewhat	here. step,	then	obviously	we	violate	conditionalization.32	But	not	if	we	try to	block	the	first	step.	Can	we	do	that? Yes:	we	should	claim	that,	when	I	have	an	equal	estimate	of	our	two reliabilities	but	a	much	higher	resilience	in	my	own	estimate,	my	prior credence	in	p	conditional	on	the	disagreement	should	not	be	0.5.	Why? Because, in	such	cases, the	disagreement is	evidence that the initial estimate	I	made	of	my	interlocutor's	reliability	is	out	of	whack	with	my interlocutor's	actual	reliability.	Crucially,	recall	that	this	is	something which	White	concedes	in	admitting	that	the	disagreement	should	lead me	to	revise	my	estimate	of	my	interlocutor's	reliability	down.	If	that's right,	then	it	seems	I	should	not	calculate	my	new	credence	based	on the	old,	faulty,	reliability	estimate.33 This isn't to deny that generally speaking, there's a connection between reliability estimates and credences. If I estimate my interlocutor's	reliability	at	0.9,	for	example,	then	generally	speaking I	should	have	a	credence	of	0.9	that	she'll	answer	correctly,	as	White points	out	(2009:	234).	So,	then,	for	example,	if	she	just	tells	me	her answer	to	a	question	that	I've	never	considered,	then	I	should	(ceteris paribus) form a credence of 0.9 in her answer. But there's always going	to	be	a	caveat	to	this	connection	between	reliability	estimate and	credence:	it	holds	only	barring	any	new	evidence	that	bears	on the	reliability	estimate.	So,	if	I	estimate	your	reliability	at	answering math	questions	at	90%,	but	then	you	act	out	your	answer	by	singing it	to	the	tune	of	Verdi's	Requiem	while	throwing	a	bucket	of	anchovies over	your	own	head,	then	I	have	gained	new	evidence	that	you	may have	gone	mad	-	in	which	case	your	reliability	may	be	worse	than	I 32. Lackey	(2010a:	314)	seems	to	take	it	that	the	first	step	is	impossible	to	block; consequently, she	denies the second step.	Thus,	her account	does seem to violate	conditionalization.	Here,	I	am	trying	to	show	that,	contrary	to	what both	White	and	Lackey	assume,	the	first	step	can	be	blocked	so	as	to	avoid this	result. 33. Again	(c.f.	fn.	10),	I	don't	mean	that	you've	received	evidence	that	your	old estimate	was an incorrect response to your	previous	evidence.	You've just received	new	evidence	that	calls	for	an	update	of	that	estimate	by	suggesting that	it	is	out	of	whack	with	the	actual	reliability	of	your	interlocutor. alex	worsnip What Disagreement about Disagreement? philosophers'	imprint – 13 – vol.	14,	no.	18	(june	2014) The	exact	same	lesson	applies	in	the	disagreement	case.	Here	my existing	estimates	of	our	reliabilities	are	analogous	to	my	credence	in C.	Upon	learning	of	an	actual	disagreement,	though,	I	gain	evidence that	undermines	those	estimates,	if	the	net	resilience	is	a	positive	nonzero	value.	The	lesson,	however,	is	not	that	I	should	therefore	violate conditionalization.	Rather,	it	is	that	my	credence	for	p	conditional	on a	disagreement	should	not	be	calculated	using	my	existing	reliability estimates,	but	rather	by	using	my	estimates	of	reliability	conditional on	a	disagreement.	This	doesn't	mean	I'm	not	justified	in	having	those estimates	now,	just	as	I	can	still	be	justified	having	high	credence	in C	now.	But	they	will	be	undermined	if	an	actual	disagreement	occurs, just	as	one's	credence	in	C	will	be	undermined	if	one	learns	the	truth of	its	antecedent. One might nevertheless worry that my situation in cases of disagreement	is	weirdly	unstable.	If	I'm	going	to	decrease	my	estimate of your reliability as soon as	we disagree, how am I really treating you	as	equally	reliable	-	as	my	peer	-	even	now?	But	remember	that disagreement	between	the	two	of	us	is	not	inevitable.	Indeed,	if	I	take us	both	to	be	highly	reliable,	I	positively	expect	us	to	agree.	Like	the possibility	that	you'll	perform	your	answer	while	throwing	anchovies, the	future	event	that	your	answer	will	disagree	with	mine	is	one	that I	assign	a	non-zero	but	non-one	credence	to,	and	it's	only	if	it	obtains that	I'll	downgrade	you.	Moreover,	as	White	points	out	(2009:	249),	if my	estimate	of	your	reliability	is	less	resilient	than	that	of	my	own,	then I	should	also	be	willing	to	increase	my	estimate	of	your	reliability	-	to higher	than	mine!	-	in	the	event	that	our	answers	agree.	And	I'll	also use	my	present	estimate	of	your reliability to respond	to	verdicts	of yours about	matters about	which I have yet to form	an	opinion, or when	I	lack	access	to	the	evidential	base	that	you	have.	So,	the	fact	that my	estimate	of	your	reliability	would	be	downgraded	in	response	to disagreement	does	not	make	that	reliability-estimate	-	and	its	status as	equal	with	mine	-	empty	or	toothless. Say	I	have	a	coin,	and	I	have	a	0.99	credence	that	the	coin	is	fair.	Now, consider	the	following	indicative	conditional:	If the coin comes up heads 1,000 times in a row, it will be a huge coincidence (that it came up heads 1,000 times in a row).	Call	this	conditional	proposition	C.	If	the	coin	is	fair,	C is	true.	So,	given	that	I	have	0.99	credence	that	the	coin	is	fair,	I	will assign	at	least	a	0.99	credence	to	C.	This	is	not	a	mistake:	it	would	be a	huge	coincidence	for	a	fair	coin	to	come	up	heads	1,000	times,	and	I have	no	reason	to	doubt	my	high	credence	that	the	coin	is	fair. However,	in	the	(by	my	lights)	unlikely	event	that	the	coin	were actually to come	up	heads 1,000 times is a row, I	would then	have reason to	become	much less confident that the coin is fair.	And if the	coin	is	not	fair,	C	may	be	false:	if	the	coin	is	sufficiently	biased, it	isn't	a	big	coincidence	that	it	came	up	heads	1,000	times	in	a	row. So,	conditional	on the	coin	coming	up	heads	1,000 times in	a row, I assign a credence	much lower than 0.99 to the proposition that it	will	be	a	huge	coincidence that it	came	up	1,000 times in	a row. In other words, my credence in the consequent of C conditional on its antecedent is not equal to my credence in C. So this is a counterexample	to	Adams'	Thesis. What generates the counterexample is the fact that when one learns the truth of the antecedent of the conditional, one gains evidence that forces one to rethink the assumptions on	which one assigned	a	high	credence	to	the	conditional	(in	this	case,	that	the	coin is fair). The right response to this case, however, is	not to hang on to	Adams'	Thesis	by	rejecting	conditionalization	and	holding	that	the probability	of	the	consequent	of	C	conditional	on	the	antecedent	of	C is	0.99,	but	that	upon	actually	learning	of	the	truth	of	the	antecedent, one	should	not	update	by	conditionalization.	Rather,	it	is	to	hang	on to conditionalization	by rejecting	Adams'	Thesis, holding that even though	one	has	credence	0.99	that	the	coin	is	fair,	and	this	proposition just	entails	that	C	is	true,	this	should	only	take	one	to	a	0.99	credence in	C,	and	not	to	a	credence	of	0.99	for	C's	consequent	conditional	on its	antecedent. alex	worsnip What Disagreement about Disagreement? philosophers'	imprint – 14 – vol.	14,	no.	18	(june	2014) However,	Christensen	himself	wants	to	avoid	the	extreme	results that	one is	not	permitted to	downgrade	people like	David,	and that one is required to conciliate significantly	with them.	So	perhaps	he can	claim	the	reasons	for	downgrading	David	actually	are	independent of	the	dispute	at	hand.	Indeed,	when	Christensen	himself	addresses cases	in	which	it	does	seem	intuitively	as	though	one	is	permitted	to downgrade	one's	estimate	of	an	interlocutor's	reliability,	he	appeals	to something	quite	similar	to	net	resilience	-	without	putting	the	point in these terms.	Christensen	considers	a case	where	he	and	a friend disagree	on	the	answer	to	a	calculation	question	that	seems	obvious and	easy.	As	he	writes: "I can eliminate (via personal information)	many	of the ways	in	which	I	could	have	failed	to	use	a	reliable	method [...]	But	I	cannot	eliminate	analogous	possibilities	for	my friend.	So	it's	likely	that	she	did	not	sincerely	announce a belief that was formed by a highly reliable method." (Christensen	2011:	10) In the case that Christensen is describing, this likelihood that the friend	did	not	use a reliable	method is something that is arrived	at after the fact of disagreement. That, Christensen thinks, is the best explanation	for	why	she	has	given	what	seems	like	a	crazy	answer	to the	question,	assuming	that	she	was	being	sincere.39	Remember	that,	in the	case	being	considered,	one	judges	oneself	equally	reliable	as	one's friend	coming	into	the	dispute.	So,	in	issuing	the	answer	that	he	does, Christensen	is	allowing	for	a	downgrade	of	his	estimate	of	his	friend's reliability	(in	the	circumstances)	in	response	to	a	disagreement.	What licenses	such	a	downgrade?	Judging	by	the	above	passage,	it	seems	to 39. I	have	been	assuming	that	we	are	interested	in	cases	where	one	knows	that there	is	an	actual	disagreement,	and	one's	interlocutor	is	not	joking	or	lying. Like	Christensen,	I	am	happy	to	allow	that	when	it	is	a	serious	possibility	that one's	interlocutor	is	not	being	sincere,	this	can	also	be	a	reason	to	refrain	from immediate	conciliation.	Note,	however,	that	in	such	a	case,	one	would	actually	not	downgrade	one's	estimate	of	one's	interlocutor's	reliability,	if	by	reliability	we	mean	the	reliability	of	their	credences,	as	opposed	to	their	utterances. 6. What disagreement about disagreement I: conciliationism As I've said, real-life philosophers do not usually accept extreme conciliationism	or	extreme	steadfastness.	They	accept	watered-down versions. So, once	we take account of these	modifications, is there anything	ultimately	dividing them?	And,	most importantly	-	having dealt	with	the	White-type	objection	- is	there	anything	to	stop	both sides	from	endorsing	the	resilience-based	view? Suppose we simply define conciliationism as the view that one is typically required to reduce one's credence in a proposition in the light	of	disagreement,	and	steadfastness	as the	view that	one is typically	permitted	to	downgrade	one's	estimate	of	one's	interlocutor's reliability in the face	of	disagreement, to avoid	giving	equal	weight to	the	two	views	under	dispute.	As	my	account	shows,	both	of	these claims	can	be	true.	All	that	is	required	is	that	in	most	situations,	the	net resilience	be	intermediate,	such	that	both	a	revision	in	credence	and	a revision	in	one's	estimate	of	the	interlocutor's	reliability	are	called	for. Under	these	definitions,	then,	they	are	not	in	disagreement	with	each other.	What,	then,	is	left	to	separate	them? Christensen (2011: 1–2) thinks that what divides steadfast and conciliatory	views	is	whether	they	allow	us,	in	revising	the	estimates	of our	interlocutors'	reliability	that	we	use	to	determine	how	to	respond to	disagreement,	to	rely	on	our	reasoning	concerning	the	proposition under	dispute.	According	to	Christensen,	conciliationist	views	require that	the	reasons	for	downgrading	one's	estimate	of	one's	interlocutor's reliability, and for correspondingly resisting a full-scale revision of one's	credence,	be	independent	of	the	dispute	at	hand.38 Earlier,	in	section	3,	I	argued	that	construed	in	the	most	naïve	way, this	independence	requirement	is	dubious.	In	the lizards,	it	seems	that I	am	permitted	to	downgrade	my	estimate	of	David's	reliability.	And doing	so	seems to	be	a	direct response to	his	crazy	view,	LIZARDS. In this respect I may seem to come down on the steadfast side of Christensen's	divide. 38.	Kelly	(2013),	a	steadfast	theorist,	accepts	this	way	of	dividing	the	views. alex	worsnip What Disagreement about Disagreement? philosophers'	imprint – 15 – vol.	14,	no.	18	(june	2014) resisting	revising	one's	credence.	So,	there	is	at	least	a	good	sense	in which	one	does	not	resist	revising	one's	credence	on	fully	independent grounds	in	such	cases. Nevertheless, there is an important point behind Christensen's attempt to enforce an independence requirement. Armed with the language	of	resilience,	we	can	express	more	clearly.	The	point	is	this: one	cannot	refuse	to	revise	down	one's	credence	in	p,	or	indeed	revise one's	estimate	of	one's interlocutor's reliability	down, simply	on the grounds that	one's	credence in	p is	high	-	that	one	finds the	denial of the claim too implausible. Rather, one	must appeal to one's net resilience.42 Here	again	we	see that	an inattention to the	distinction	between reliability and resilience obscures the debate over disagreement. Clearly, a refusal to revise	one's credence	on the	basis	of	one's	high credence for	p	does	not	count	as independent.	And	clearly	a refusal to	revise	one's	credence	on	the	basis	of	an	antecedently	low	estimate of	one's interlocutor's	reliability	does	count	as independent.	But	what about	a	refusal	based	on	a	non-antecedent	downgraded	estimate	of	one's interlocutor's	reliability, formed	in	response	to	the	disagreement,	but due	to	an	antecedently	low	net	resilience?	Because	the	debate	has	not even	been	framed	so	as	to	clearly	distinguish	this	third	possibility,	it	is not	obviously	determinate	how	the	major	parties	to	the	debate	answer this	question.	But	it	may	well	be	that	while	conciliationists	are	thinking of this	sort	of reasoning	as	satisfying the independence	requirement, steadfast	theorists	are	thinking	of	it	as	not	satisfying	the	independence requirement,	thus	masking	substantial	underlying	agreement.43 42. That	said,	the	fact	that	a	particular	proposition	seems	so	obvious	can	be	of indirect	relevance,	since	the	resilience	of	your	estimate	of	your	own	reliability	will	likely	be	especially	high	for	especially	obvious-seeming	propositions. But	that	said,	the	resilience	of	your	reliability	estimate	is	certainly	not	a	bare function	of	your	level	of	credence	in	the	proposition	you	are	estimating	your reliability	with	respect	to. 43. This is	reflected	in	the	dialectic	between	Lackey	(2010a:	309–310;	323–24) and	Christensen.	Lackey	anticipates	Christensen's	points	about	your	asymmetrical	ability	to	rule	out	possibilities	of	your	own	unreliability	via	"personal information,"	a	term	which	is	originally	hers.	However,	she	says	that,	since	it	is be	the	fact	that	he	is	more	confident	that	he	is	reliable	than	he	is	that	his friend	is	reliable.	In	other	words,	his	net	resilience	is	high.40 So,	I	think	that	Christensen's	reasons	for	resisting	a	revision	of	one's credences	in	such	cases	ultimately	come	down	to	net	resilience.	The question	we	now	face	is	whether	such	reasons	are	properly	described as independent of the dispute under consideration. Christensen might	argue	here	as	follows:	it's	a	precondition	of	downgrading	one's interlocutor that one antecedently have a lower resilience for one's estimate	of	her	reliability	than	one	has	for	one's	own	reliability.	And these antecedent resiliences are independent of the matter under dispute.	So,	the	reasoning	is	properly	described	as	independent.41 In at least some sense, however, this is	misleading. In the	most paradigmatic case where one resists revising one's credence in a disagreement on grounds independent of the dispute, one does so because	one	antecedently	thought	one's	interlocutor	less	reliable	than oneself.	In	such	a	case,	one	already	thinks	-	before	encountering	the disagreement	-	that	one's	interlocutor	is	less	reliable	on	these	matters than	oneself.	In	the	cases	at	hand,	however,	things	are	different.	One does	not	antecedently	think	one's	interlocutor	less	reliable	than	oneself, and	it is	the	disagreement itself	which	causes	one	to	downgrade	one's estimate	of	one's	interlocutor's	reliability.	Were	it	not	for	the	reasoning that	produced	the	disagreement,	one	would	still	be	estimating	one's interlocutor's reliability as equal to one's own. Granted, it is also a precondition	of this	downgrade that	one	have	a	high	net resilience, and	that	net	resilience	might	itself	be	disagreement-independent.	But the	disagreement	itself	-	and	thus	the	reasoning	the	produced	it	-	is nevertheless necessary for the downgrade, which is what justifies 40.	See	also	Christensen	(2007:	203;	2011:	15–17),	where	he	appeals	to	the	fact that	an	evaluation	of	an	interlocutor's	reliability	might	either	fail	to	give	one reason to think that one is	more reliable than	one's interlocutor, or,	more strongly,	give	one	positive	reason	to	think	that	one	is	no	more	reliable	than one's	interlocutor,	and	claims	that	only	in	the	latter	case	is	one	required	to revise	one's	credences.	Again,	one	might	think	of	net	resilience	as	a	way	of capturing	this	difference,	except	as	a	spectrum	rather	than	a	binary	division. 41. Many	thanks	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	sharpening	this	suggestion. alex	worsnip What Disagreement about Disagreement? philosophers'	imprint – 16 – vol.	14,	no.	18	(june	2014) 7. What disagreement about disagreement II: steadfastness This	brings	us	to	the	steadfast	view.	Perhaps	there	is	some	theoretical commitment in this view which conflicts with the moderate view I have presented, thus dividing the camps fundamentally after all. Recall that the extreme steadfast view said that encountering disagreement,	at least	with	anyone	who	you	do	not regard	as	more epistemically reliable than you, is never in itself a reason to adjust your	credences.	This	sounds	very	extreme.	Nevertheless,	an	advocate of	extreme	steadfastness	might	clarify	that	it	is	only	supposed	to	justify steadfastness	on	the	part	of	the	party	who	had	the	ideal	credence	in light	of	the	shared	pre-existing	evidence.	This	is	sometimes	called	the "right	reasons"	view.44 As	conciliationists	like	Christensen	(2007:	209;	2011:	5)	have	pointed out,	however,	the	very	existence	of	the	disagreement	seems	to	be	new evidence	that	changes	the	evidential	position	one	faces	compared	with one's	pre-disagreement	situation.	In	the	case	where	one's	antecedent credence was the ideal credence, it is misleading evidence	-	but evidence	nonetheless	-	and thus changes the ideal credence.45	As it stands, the steadfast view is still committed to the incredible result that	such	misleading	evidence	is	impossible,	or	that	it	is	incapable	of changing	the	ideal	credence.	For	example,	it's	committed	to	denying	the intuition	that	in	dinner check,	if	you	actually	got	the	answer	right,	you nevertheless	ought	to	be	less	confident	on	encountering	disagreement. To avoid this, the steadfast theorist	must concede that it is your total evidence post-disagreement	-	including the existence of the disagreement	-	that determines what your post-disagreement 44. See	Kelly	(2005);	Titelbaum	(forthcoming).	One	might	think	that	this	dependence in verdict on	whether your credence	was correct pre-disagreement rather	misses the point of the disagreement debate; for this criticism, see Enoch	(2010:	967–68). 45. As	noted	in	fn.	19	above,	Kelly	appeared	to	deny	this	in	his	early	work,	but	he later	concedes	the	point:	see	Kelly	(2010:	136–38). If the conciliationist says that the independence requirement is to be understood so that this reasoning does satisfy it, then the conciliationist	position	fully	converges	with	my	moderate,	resiliencebased account. Nevertheless, having already indicated why I nevertheless	find	talk	of independence	potentially	misleading,	there is another important point	which bears stressing here. Christensen talks as if the cases in	which	one can	downgrade	one's interlocutor consistent with independence are somehow special cases. But once we	see	that	they	are	to	be	understood	in	terms	of	net	resilience,	we see that they	are	not special at all; they	are the	norm.	For	whenever the	net	resilience	has	some	positive	non-zero	value,	some	amount	of downgrading	of	one's	estimate	of	an interlocutor's reliability	will	be called	for.	And	the	net	resilience	almost	always	does	have	a	positive non-zero	value,	since	one	typically	possesses	much	better	track-record data	for	oneself	than	for	one's	interlocutor. This	means	that	the	independence	requirement	understood	in	this broad	way	will	very	rarely	actually	forbid	one	from	downgrading	one's estimate	of	an	interlocutor's	reliability	in	the	face	of	disagreement,	or force	one	to	rely	only	on	one's	antecedent	estimate	of	that	reliability. Consequently,	it	now	seems	like	something	relatively	innocuous	even for a steadfast theorist to accept. After all, it is entirely consistent with	the	practical	advice	that	one	may	remain	relatively	steadfast in a	very	wide	range	of	cases.	And	it is that	practical	advice	that	many steadfasters	are	keen	to	make	good	on.	So, it	seems	that	once	again, there	is	less	dividing	the	camps	than	it	first	appears. only	in	response	to	the	occurrence	of	disagreement	that	the	downgrade	takes place, the reason for	downgrading cannot	be independent	of the	disagreement,	whereas	Christensen says that it can	be.	Here	matters are	obscured by the lack of clarity over	what 'independent of the disagreement'	means. Lackey	is	clearly	right	that	there	is	a	good	sense	in	which	the	downgrade	is not	independent	of	the	disagreement,	since	it	takes	place	in	response	to	that disagreement.	But	she	is	mistaken	to	think	that	this	shows	that	what	justifies the	downgrade	is	your	level	of	(justified)	first-order	confidence	in	the	proposition	under	dispute.	Rather,	what	she	says	about	personal	information	can be	understood	in	terms	of	net	resilience. alex	worsnip What Disagreement about Disagreement? philosophers'	imprint – 17 – vol.	14,	no.	18	(june	2014) the resilience-based view "throws away" evidence which the total evidence	view	does	not	throw	away? Perhaps	it	might	be	charged	that,	because	the	resilience-based	view makes	everything	depend	upon	your	antecedent	credence,	reliability estimates, and	net resilience, it cannot give a role to	what the firstorder evidence regarding p actually supports.49 This is misleading, however. The resilience-based view is supposed to give an answer to the question of how you should alter your doxastic attitudes in light	of	a	disagreement. It is itself silent	on the	question	of	what those doxastic attitudes should be pre-disagreement, leaving that up	to	other	doxastic	norms.	Nor	does	it	say	that,	just	by	conforming to the resilience-based view, you	will have an all-things-considered reasonable	doxastic	attitude.50	To	be	sure,	you	will	have	responded to disagreement in the correct	way,	but things	will	have	gone	wrong in your doxastic states pre-disagreement so that your final attitude is nevertheless unreasonable. If you feed crazy inputs into a rational process,	you	may	get	crazy	outputs:	that	is	the	fault	of	the	inputs,	not the	process.51 Suppose	that,	as	Kelly	assumes,	the	doxastic	norms	tell	you	to	set your pre-disagreement credence in light of your pre-disagreement 49. To	sharpen	this	worry,	note	that	the	resilience-based	view,	as	I	have	stated	it, gives	a	broadly	symmetrical	account	of	how	the	'right'	party	and	the	'wrong' party	should	respond	to	disagreement:	So,	for	example,	suppose	that	David himself	has	just	as	high	a	net	resilience	as	I	do:	the	view	sketched	here	tells David	to	be	just	as	steadfast	in	his	view	as	I	am	in	mine. 50.	Kelly	(2010:	127)	has	a	further	response	to	this	move,	but	it	is	convincingly responded	to	in	turn	by	Christensen	(2011:	5–8). 51. Indeed,	similar	points	apply	even	to	an	equal	weight	view:	see	Christensen (2011:	4–8).	Similar	issues	arise	with	any	norm	that	tells	you	what	to	do	in light	of	pre-existing	attitudes	-	for	example,	norms	of	instrumental	rationality.	Here, the	wide-scope	view	(see	fn.	9	above)	handles	things	very	nicely. Another	possibility	(Björnsson	&	Finlay	2010;	Wedgwood	ms.)	is	that	some form	of	contextualism	about	deontic	terms	can	be	developed	so	that	there	is	a more	'subjective'	sense	of	'should'	which	takes	your	pre-existing	attitudes	as fixed	and	tells	you	what	to	do	or	believe	in	light	of	them,	and	a	more	'objective'	sense	of	'should'	which	refers	to	what	you	should	do	or	believe	given	the objectively	correct	pre-existing	attitudes. credence	should	be.46	Now,	however, it is	unclear that the steadfast theorist is saying	anything that the	moderate, resilience-based	view has	to	deny.47	According	to	the	resilience-based	view,	disagreements typically provide evidence that warrants a downgrade in credence, but they also provide evidence which warrants a downgrade in one's estimate of one's interlocutor's reliability, thus tempering the downgrade	in	credence.	This	seems	entirely	consistent	with	the	claim that	it	is	your	total	evidence	post-disagreement	that	determines	what your	post-disagreement	credence	should	be.	Such	a	claim	still	allows for	the	possibility	that	disagreement	often	ought	to	have	a	significance effect	on	your	credence. The	steadfast	theorist	may	now	claim	that	the	difference	simply	lies in	how	significant	this	effect	should	be.	In	particular,	the	"equal	weight" conciliationist	view	says	that	post-disagreement,	you	should	split	your credence	between	your	pre-disagreement	credence	and	that	of	your interlocutor.	Kelly	worries	that	this	makes	the	evidence	upon	which your	belief	was	initially	based	simply	drop	out	as	irrelevant,	and	thus amount	to	throwing	away	evidence.48	Thus,	perhaps	the	total	evidence view	is	departed	from	after	all. As	we've already seen, this equal	weight extreme conciliationist view is implausible, at least as a generalization, and neglects the importance of resilience. The resilience-based view, like the total evidence	view,	entails	that	in	most	cases	of	disagreement,	one	should revise one's credence down somewhat, but not as far as the equal weight	view	would	suggest.	Is	there	nevertheless	some	sense	in	which 46.	C.f.	Kelly	(2010:	141–50)	and	Weatherson	(ms.).	The	Lackey	(2010a,	2010b) view already considered in section 4 above is similar, though I think not identical. 47. This	isn't	to	say	that	the	total	evidence	claim	is	necessarily	true,	at	least	construed	as	a	claim	about	rationality.	(See	Worsnip	ms-a.)	But	these	concerns are orthogonal to the (supposed)	dispute	over disagreement.	The	point is that	if	one	is	convinced	by	the	total	evidence	claim,	the	resilience-based	view can	accommodate	it. 48. See	Kelly	(2010:	122–25).	C.f.	also	Weatherson	(ms.). alex	worsnip What Disagreement about Disagreement? philosophers'	imprint – 18 – vol.	14,	no.	18	(june	2014) A steadfast theorist might still object, however, that there is something important separating the resilience-based view and the steadfast	view.	According	to	the	resilience-based	view,	one	needs	to have	a	high	net	resilience	to	resist	revising	one's	credence	in	response to a disagreement. A steadfast theorist might now charge that, although	net	resilience	can	explain	why	one	should	not	conciliate	in a	significant	range	of	cases, there	are	other	cases	where	one	should not	conciliate:	cases	where	one's	first-order	evidence	for	one's	original credence is simply overwhelmingly strong. The steadfast theorist might	hold	that	one	should	remain	steadfast	in	such	cases	even	if	one's net	resilience	is	not	high.54 One	might think that it	would	be	easy to	construct	cases	where one's	first-order	evidence for	one's	original credence is	very strong, but	one's	net	resilience	is	low.	Actually,	though,	it	is	not	as	easy	as	it seems.	For in	general, if	one's	first-order	evidence	for	one's	original credence	is	very	strong,	and	one	recognizes	this,	one	ought	to	have a relatively high net resilience. Here is why. Remember that the reliability	at	issue	when	one	makes	reliability	estimates	is	reliability	in the circumstances.	If	we	are	discussing	baseball,	I	am	interested	in	your reliability	on	matters	concerning	baseball,	not the	overall	reliability of your	beliefs.	Now,	when it comes to some	matter	on	which	one has	overwhelmingly	strong	evidence,	one	generally	has	good	reason to	be	extremely	resilient	about	one's	own	reliability.	So,	for	example, consider	elementary	mathematical	calculation,	where	basic	sums	are overwhelmingly obvious. These are amongst the cases	where it is easiest	to	know	that	one	is	reliable:	where	it	is	not	only	the	case	that one is very reliable, but	where	one is extremely confident in	one's own	reliability. Now, one may also have a relatively resilient estimate of an interlocutor's	reliability	on	such	matters.	But	it	will	not	be	as	resilient as one's estimate of one's own reliability	-	for the sorts of reasons that Christensen drew our attention to: one cannot eliminate the 54. I	am	very	grateful	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	pressing	this	objection. evidence.52	The	resilience-based	view	then	tells	you	how	to	respond to a disagreement given that pre-disagreement credence and other estimates you have. Given that, the pre-disagreement first-order evidence will in no way drop out in determining what your postdisagreement credence ought to be, since it sets the baseline from which you should be conducting revisions (as well as potentially making	an	indirect	difference	to	the	resilience	of	your	estimate	of	your own	reliability	in	the	circumstances).	The	magnitude	of	the	revision demanded	by	the	resilience-based	model	does	not	automatically	adjust such that you'll end up	with the same post-disagreement credence regardless of your pre-disagreement credence.53 So, the resiliencebased	view	is	compatible	with	the	claim	that	your	final	credence	postdisagreement	should	reflect	your	total	evidence. 52. The	nice	thing	about	you,	as	an	epistemic	agent,	is	that	you	can	do	your	best to set your pre-disagreement credence in response to all the pre-disagreement	evidence.	In	this	respect	you	are	importantly	different	to	a	thermometer (c.f.	White	2009;	Enoch	2010),	but	in	a	way	that	actually	makes	it	easier	to	line up	your	credence	with	your	estimate	of	your	own	reliability	than	with	that	of a	thermometer's	reliability.	White	(2009:	241)	points	out	that	you	should	not always	line	up	your	credence	in	a	thermometer's	verdict	with	the	reliability	of that	thermometer,	since	you	may	be	aware	of	other	evidence	bearing	on	the temperature	other	than	the	thermometer's	reading.	But	the	same	issue	does not	arise	with	respect	to	you,	precisely	because	your	credence	is	your	attempt to	respond	to	all	the	evidence	of	which	you	are	aware.	So,	you	should	not	find yourself	wondering	how	to	balance	this	credence	against	further	evidence	of which	you	are	aware.	Consequently,	basing	your	credence	on	your	estimate of	your	own	reliability	is	at	least	never	knowingly	to	"throw	away	evidence"	in the	way	that	basing	a	credence	solely	on	your	estimate	of	a	thermometer's reliability	might	be;	nor	is	it	ever	to	throw	away	evidence	that	you	had	previously	responded	to. 53. Once	more,	the	same	goes	for	the	equal	weight	view.	It	might	be	tempting to	think	that	the	equal	weight	view	tells	you	to	move	to	credence	0.5,	so	it doesn't	matter	what	your	pre-disagreement	credence	was:	you'll	always	end up	responding	to	disagreement	the	same	way.	But	that's	not	what	the	equal weight	view	says.	The	equal	weight	view	tells	you	to	split	the	difference	between	your	credence	and	that	of	your	interlocutor.	It	only	tells	you	to	move to	credence	0.5	in	the	special	case	where	you	and	your	interlocutor	have	credences	that	are	equal	distance	from	0.5	on	different	sides.	Holding	fixed	your interlocutor's	credence,	your	pre-disagreement	credence	certainly	will	make a	difference	to	what	your	post-disagreement	credence	should	be	on	the	equal weight	view. alex	worsnip What Disagreement about Disagreement? philosophers'	imprint – 19 – vol.	14,	no.	18	(june	2014) So, while the steadfast theorist could distance herself from the resilience-based	view	by	claiming	that	one	may	remain	steadfast	even when	the	net	resilience	is	low,	I	do	not	think	that	she	should	do	this. The	resilience-based	view	can	get	her the	practical result she	wants that	in	a	very	wide	range	of	cases,	one	is	permitted	to	remain	relatively steadfast;	including	the	vast	majority	of	cases	where	one's	first-order evidence	supports	one's	view	overwhelmingly.	And	the	cases	where the resilience-based view does not support steadfastness are ones where	the	disagreement	really	is	very	strong	countervailing	evidence against	one's	first-order	evidence.	And	that	is	exactly	the	result	which a	fan	of	the	total	evidence	view	should	want. Both the total	evidence	view	and	the	resilience-based	view, then, can	think	of	you	as	starting	with	a	pre-disagreement	credence	based on your pre-disagreement evidence and then responding to the new	evidence you	gain from the	disagreement.	And, as	we've seen, Christensen's moderation of the conciliationist view collapses, on its most charitable interpretation, into the resilience-based view. Surprisingly, then, we find nothing that identifiably separates the moderate	version	of	the	steadfast	view	from	the	moderate	version	of its conciliationist rival, and	nothing that prevents either party from embracing	the	moderate,	resilience-based	view.	Even	if	it	turns	out	that there	are	some	differences	to	be	found,	though,	the	moderate	account does	well	explaining	and	accommodating	the	intuitions	behind	both sides.	As	things	stand,	it	seems	to	me	a	very	promising	candidate	to resolve	the	(seeming)	disagreement	about	disagreement.57 57. In	writing	this	paper,	I	have	benefitted	from	conversations	with	David	Black, David Christensen, Steve Darwall, Keith DeRose, Georgi Gardiner, Alvin Goldman, John	Pittard, Sander	Verhaegh, and Steve	Yablo. I am also very grateful to two extraordinarily helpful anonymous referees at	Philosophers' Imprint for	written comments. Thanks also to participants at a conference hosted	by	the	University	of	Miami,	where	an	earlier	version	of	the	paper	was presented,	and	to	Micah	Dugas	for	serving	as	the	commentator	there. possibility that one's interlocutor has suffered a temporary fit of madness,	or	that	he	is	on	drugs,	or	something	similar,	in	the	way	that one	can	eliminate	these	possibilities	for	oneself.	So,	given	that	one's estimate	of	one's	own	reliability	is	so	resilient,	the	net	resilience	is	still significantly	above	zero.	Given	these	facts,	the	resilience-based	view does	predict the steadfast theorist's result that in	most cases	where one	has	overwhelmingly	strong	evidence,	one	may	remain	steadfast. Of	course,	the	steadfast	theorist	could	now	try	just	stipulating	that in some particular case, one has overwhelmingly strong first-order evidence	but	the	resiliences	are	the	same:	one	is	no	better	able	to	rule out	the	possibility	that	one	have	oneself	suffered	a	fit	of	madness	than one	can	rule that	possibility	out for	one's friend. I	do	not	claim	that this is impossible;	merely	very	atypical.	But	when this	very	atypical case is	explicitly	stipulated, it	does	not	seem	intuitively	attractive to me	that	one	should	remain	steadfast.	Again,	it's	not	that	the	first-order evidence	gets thrown	away	here; rather, it's just that in such	a	case, the	disagreement	really	is	quite	strong	(even	if	ultimately	misleading) countervailing evidence that you yourself	may	be the one	who	has suffered the fit of madness. The strength of this countervailing evidence	cannot	just	be	stipulated	away	by	the	steadfast	theorist.	And it	calls	for	a	significant	reduction	in	credence,	by	the	very	lights	of	the total	evidence	view.55	So, the	unusual case in	which	one	has strong first-order evidence but a low net resilience is not one where one should	remain	steadfast,	even	by	the	lights	of	the	total	evidence	view.56 55. See	Christensen	(2007:	200)	for	another	very	compelling	case	where	one's pre-disagreement evidence overwhelmingly supports a proposition, but one	should	conciliate	significantly	upon	encountering	disagreement.	Again, this	case	is	plausibly	read	as	exemplifying	the	unusual	pattern	where	one has	a	low	net	resilience	despite	having	very	strong	first-order	evidence	for one's	view. 56.	As	we	saw	in	section	4,	a	case	where	one	has	a	high	net	resilience	just	is	one where	one	should	downgrade	one's	estimate	of	one's	interlocutor's	reliability. So, the fact that	one	may	not	remain	steadfast	despite	a low	net resilience means	that	one	cannot	have	a	case	where	one	should	remain	steadfast	without	downgrading	one's	estimate	of	one's	interlocutor's	reliability,	chalking	it up	merely	to	an	uncharacteristic	error	on	one's	interlocutor's	part. alex	worsnip What Disagreement about Disagreement? philosophers'	imprint – 20 – vol.	14,	no.	18	(june	2014) King,	N.L. (2012). "Disagreement:	What's the Problem?	Or A	Good Peer	is	Hard	to	Find,"	Philosophy & Phenomenological Research,	85/2: 249–272. Lackey,	J.	(2010a).	"A	Justificationist	View	of	Disagreement's	Epistemic Significance," in Haddock, Millar & Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. ---. (2010b). "What Should We Do When We Disagree?" Oxford Studies in Epistemology,	3:	274–293. Lam, B. (2013). "Calibrated probabilities and the epistemology of disagreement,"	Synthese,	190/6:	1079–1098. McGee,	V.	(2000).	"To	tell	the	truth	about	conditionals,"	Analysis,	60/1: 107–111. Skyrms,	B.	(1980).	Causal Necessity.	New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press. Titelbaum,	M.	(forthcoming).	"Rationality's	Fixed	Point	(Or:	In	Defense of	Right	Reason),"	Oxford Studies in Epistemology,	5. Van	Inwagen,	P.	(2010).	"We're	Right.	They're	Wrong,"	in	Feldman	& Warfield	(2010). Weatherson, B. (ms.). "Do Judgments Screen Evidence?," draft manuscript,	University	of	Michigan. Wedgwood, R. (ms.). "Objective and Subjective 'Ought'," draft manuscript,	University	of	Southern	California. White,	R.	(2009).	"On	Treating	Oneself	and	Others	as	Thermometers," Episteme,	6/3:	233–250. Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University	Press. ---.	(2007).	The Philosophy of Philosophy.	Oxford:	Blackwell. Worsnip,	A.	(ms-a).	"The	Irrelevance	of	Evidence	(to	Rationality),"	draft manuscript,	Yale	University. ---. (ms-b).	Rationality's Demands on Belief. Draft dissertation, Yale University. References Adams,	E.W.	(1965).	"The	Logic	of	Conditionals,"	Inquiry,	8:	166–197. Björnsson, G. & Finlay, S. (2010). "Metaethical Contextualism Defended,"	Ethics,	121/1:	7–36. Broome,	J.	(1999).	"Normative	requirements,"	Ratio,	12:	398–419. ---.	(2013).	Rationality Through Reasoning.	Chichester:	Wiley-Blackwell. Christensen, D. (2007). "Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News,"	Philosophical Review,	116:	187–217. ---. (2011). "Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic SelfCriticism,"	Philosophers' Imprint,	11/6. Dancy,	J.	(2000).	Practical Reality.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Elga,	A.	(2007).	"Reflection	and	Disagreement,"	Noûs, 41/3: 478–502. Enoch,	D.	(2010). "Not	Just	a	Truthometer:	Taking	Oneself	Seriously (but not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement," Mind, 119/476:	953–997. Feldman,	R.	(2006).	"Epistemological	Puzzles	about	Disagreement,"	in Hetherington	(ed.),	Epistemology Futures.	Oxford:	Oxford	University Press. Feldman, R. & Warfield, T.A. (eds.) (2010). Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford	University	Press. Joyce,	J.M.	(2005).	"How	Probabilities	Reflect	Evidence,"	Philosophical Perspectives,	19:	153–178. Kaufmann, S. (2004). "Conditioning Against the Grain," Journal of Philosophical Logic,	33:	583–606. Kelly,	T.	(2005).	"The	Epistemic	Significance	of	Disagreement,"	Oxford Studies in Epistemology,	1:	167–196. ---. (2010). "Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence," in Feldman	&	Warfield	(2010). ---. (2013). "Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment," in Christensen	&	Lackey	(eds.),	The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.